


A RAND NOTE

Sample Campaign Plans and Staff Assessment for
NATO's Southern Region

David A. Shlapak, Samuel Gardiner,
William Simons

August 1989

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



This document has been approved
for public release and is in
the public domain.

RAND

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The RAND Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research results. The RAND Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The RAND Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of RAND research.

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER N-2858-NA	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Sample Campaign Plans and Staff Assessments for NATO's Southern Region		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED interim
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) David A. Shlapak, Samuel Gardiner, William Simons		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) MDA903-85-C_0030
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS The RAND Corporation 1700 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90406		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Director of Net Assessment Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington, DC 20301		12. REPORT DATE August 1989
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 52
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) No Restrictions		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Military Planning; Military Exerciese Military Strategy; War Games Joint Military Activities Military Training		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) see reverse side		

DD FORM 1473

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

This Note is the product of an intensive six-month effort by the RAND Strategy Assessment Center in support of the National Defense University's (NDU) spring 1988 Allied Forces Southern Europe seminar war game. This week-long exercise represented the capstone in the university's year-long program to introduce field-grade officers to the concepts and issues involved in joint and combined operations at the theater level. RAND provided game materials for both NDU students and faculty. The Note comprises the reference materials developed for the exercise, including (1) a summary of the geography of the Southern Region; (2) a sample staff assessment of the overall balance of forces in the area; (3) parallel assessments for each of the three land subtheaters (Northern Italy, the Balkans, and Eastern Turkey); (4) a sample NATO campaign plan; (5) a sample Warsaw Pact campaign plan for the Southwestern theater of military operations; and (6) a quantitative NATO-Warsaw Pact force balance summary for the Southern Region.

A RAND NOTE

N-2858-NA

Sample Campaign Plans and Staff Assessments for NATO's Southern Region

David A. Shlapak, Samuel Gardiner,
William Simons

August 1989

Prepared for
The Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/ _____	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

RAND
00 111 10

PREFACE

This Note results from an intensive half-year effort by the RAND Strategy Assessment Center in support of the National Defense University's Spring 1988 Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) seminar war game. This week-long exercise represented the capstone in the university's year-long program to introduce field-grade officers to the concepts and issues involved in joint and combined operations on the theater level. It should be of interest to those involved in military education and computer-supported wargaming. In addition, it contains a substantial amount of unclassified information on the Southern Region, and may be useful to analysts examining security issues in that area.

This study was sponsored jointly by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by NDU. It was performed within RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Comments are welcome and may be made to the authors at The RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C. (telephone (202) 296-5000; electronic mail (ARPANet) david@rondo@rand-unix.ARPA), or to Dr. Paul K. Davis, Director of the RAND Strategy Assessment Center.

SUMMARY

This Note results from an intensive half-year effort by the RAND Strategy Assessment Center in support of the National Defense University's Spring 1988 Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) seminar war game. This week-long exercise represented the capstone in the university's year-long program to introduce field-grade officers to the concepts and issues involved in joint and combined operations on the theater level.

RAND was the primary source of game materials for both NDU students and faculty. The present Note combines the reference material developed for the exercise. These include

- A summary of the geography of the Southern Region;
- A sample staff assessment of the overall balance of forces in the AFSOUTH area of responsibility;
- Parallel assessments for each of the three land subtheaters (Northern Italy, the Balkans, and Eastern Turkey);
- A sample NATO campaign plan to serve as a strawman for the students' own thoughts;
- A sample Warsaw Pact campaign plan for the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations (SWTVD);
- As an appendix, a quantitative NATO-Warsaw Pact force balance summary for the Southern Region.

All the material included in this Note, with the exception of the SWTVD campaign plan, was packaged together and provided to all students in the exercise several days before it began. The SWTVD plan was briefed to them at the conclusion of the game.

Although care was taken to provide the most accurate information possible, the material found in this Note was assembled using only open sources, and was provided as terms of reference for the exercise. Most of the information used was derived from such sources as *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, *Soviet Military Power 1987*, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, the *NATO Handbook*, and so on. Data not available in the unclassified literature were created by the authors. Likewise, the Blue campaign plan included is entirely notional, and is not based

on any classified NATO or U.S. plans. The SWTVD campaign plan was derived from the authors' understanding of Soviet doctrine and military style.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, the authors wish to thank the faculty and staff of the Department of Joint and Combined Operations at the National War College. In particular, our gratitude goes to Colonel Michael Krause, USA, who developed, organized, and led the exercise with patience and skill. Also of great assistance to us were Lieutenant Colonel Gary Engel, USAF, Captain Warren Hudson, USN, and Colonel David Ohle, USA. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Might, USAF, of the National Defense University was our very able action officer.

Out of uniform, Barry Wilson and Loretta Verma of RAND performed all of the computer modeling and case runs for the exercise; Patrick Allen, also of RAND, aided in the design and implementation of several new model methodologies. Paul Davis, the Director of the RAND Strategy Assessment Center, and Bruce Bennett, Associate Director, provided support and wise counsel throughout the project.

William Daniel of CACI Federal, Inc., RAND's RSAS support associate, contributed advice, ideas, and humor at moments requiring all three.

Bruce Pimic of RAND ably performed the thankless task of reviewing this Note, while Patricia Bedrosian tackled an arduous editing task with admirable grace. Kimberly Stevens provided secretarial support throughout the project.

Having thus documented how widely the credit for this work must be shared, the authors must reluctantly assert that any errors of omission or commission in this Note are theirs alone.

CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	iii
SUMMARY.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
CONTENTS.....	ix
FIGURES AND TABLES	xi
Section	
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFSOUTH REGION	1
Northern Italy	1
The Balkans	1
Eastern Turkey	1
The Mediterranean	2
II. AFSOUTH WARTIME COMMAND STRUCTURE.....	5
Greece and Turkey	7
Spain	7
III. WARSAW PACT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	8
Introduction.....	8
WTVD, SWTVD, and STVD	8
Pact Forces in the SWTVD.....	8
IV. BALANCE OF FORCES IN NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION	10
Introduction.....	10
A Note on Terminology	10
The Opposing Land and Air Forces.....	10
Relative Logistics Capabilities	13
Nuclear and Chemical Warfare Capabilities.....	14
Naval Forces	16
Mine Warfare Capabilities	17
V. THE NORTH ITALIAN THEATER	20
Ground Forces	20
Air Forces	20
Logistics	21
Theater Summary	22
VI. THRACE AND THE BALKANS	23
Ground Forces	23
Air Forces	23
Logistics	26
Theater Summary	27
VII. EASTERN TURKEY	28
Ground Forces	28
Air Forces	28
Logistics	29
Theater Summary	30

VIII.	AN AFSOUTH CAMPAIGN PLAN	31
	Situation	31
	Enemy Forces	31
	Friendly Forces	31
	Assumptions	31
	Mission	32
	Operations	32
	Logistics	35
	Command and Signal	35
IX.	SWTVD CAMPAIGN PLAN	37
	Situation	37
	Enemy Forces	37
	Friendly Forces	37
	Mission	38
	Operations	38
	Contingencies	39
	Phase I: Crisis and Attack Preparation	39
	Phase II: Defense and Denial	41
	Phase III: The Battle for the Dardanelles	42
	Phase IV: Consolidation	44
	Phase V: Breakout	47
	APPENDIX: FORCE BALANCE ANNEX	49

FIGURES

1.1	AFSOUTH area of responsibility	2
1.2	The North Italian theater	3
1.3	The Balkan theater	3
1.4	The Eastern Turkish theater	4
2.1	AFSOUTH wartime command structure	6
4.1	NATO/Pact ground and air forces	11
4.2	NATO/Pact buildup curves	13
4.3	NATO/Pact EDs by nationality	14
4.4	NATO/Pact tacair by nationality	15
4.5	Warsaw Pact chemical warfare capabilities	16
4.6	NATO chemical warfare capabilities	17
4.7	Warsaw Pact mine warfare capabilities	19
5.1	Italian and Pact forces in the theater	21
5.2	EDs by category, North Italian theater	22
6.1	Thrace and the Balkans	24
6.2	EDs available in Thrace and the Balkans	25
6.3	Pact EDs by nationality, Balkan theater	25
7.1	Ground forces in Eastern Turkey	29
7.2	EDs in Eastern Turkey	30
9.1	Axes of advance for Phase III	44
9.2	Axes of advance for Phase IV	46

TABLES

4.1	ED values for NATO and Warsaw Pact units	11
4.2	U.S. and Soviet naval forces	18
4.3	NSWP and non-U.S. NATO naval forces	18
4.4	NATO mine warfare capability	19
A.1	Warsaw Pact ground and air forces opposing AFSOUTH	49
A.2	Warsaw Pact naval forces opposing AFSOUTH	50
A.3	AFSOUTH ground and air forces	51
A.4	AFSOUTH naval forces	52

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE AFSOUTH REGION

The area of responsibility (AOR) for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) is shown in Fig. 1.1. It can, operationally speaking, be broken down into four related but separate subregions: Northern Italy, the Balkans, Eastern Turkey, and the greater Mediterranean.¹

NORTHERN ITALY

The Northern Italian theater is pictured in Fig. 1.2. This region is shielded to the east by the territory of neutral Yugoslavia, and to the north by both neutral Austria and the rugged Alpine terrain. The main approach to Northern Italy is through the Gorizia Gap, a narrow strip passing out of Yugoslavia along the Adriatic Coast. An alternative approach would channel attacking forces through a small number of corridors in the Austrian Alps, descending into Italy from the north.

THE BALKANS

Figure 1.3 shows the Balkan theater, which mainly constitutes Greek and Turkish Thrace. The principal land approach to Greece proper runs through the Vardar River valley in Yugoslavia, whereas the main corridor into Greek Thrace runs from Sofia in Bulgaria along the Sturma River to Thessaloniki. Turkish Thrace, farther east, is accessible from Bulgaria over land, and is also vulnerable to seaborne attack across the Black Sea. Several approaches funnel out of Bulgaria to the Bosphorus at Istanbul.

EASTERN TURKEY

The third land subtheater is Eastern Turkey, depicted in Fig. 1.4. Here, any campaign would be dominated by the severe nature of the terrain. The only practicable invasion routes run roughly from Batumi to Samsun along the north coast, and from Leninakan and Yerevan in Soviet Armenia toward Erzurum in central Turkey. The road network in this area is sparse and poorly maintained, and the highly channeled nature of the potential avenues of advance would seem to leave the advantage squarely with the defender.

¹ By "greater Mediterranean" we mean the Mediterranean itself, along with the Aegean Sea and the other bodies of water that together wash the shores of Southern Europe, the Levant, and North Africa.



Fig. 1.1— AFSOUTH area of responsibility

THE MEDITERRANEAN

The final subtheater of operations in the AFSOUTH AOR is the Mediterranean. Although the results of a battle here will have a major impact on the course of a war ashore, any naval conflict would have a character entirely its own, especially in its early stages.

For example, given the generally low level of preparedness among Pact forces in the SWTVD, it is entirely possible that a general East-West war in Europe would break out on NATO's northern and central fronts days or weeks before the onset of hostilities in NATO's Southern Region. Depending on the strategic choices of the two warring sides, the naval campaign in the Mediterranean could be fought and decided before the initial land attacks in AFSOUTH; indeed, the results of that campaign might influence a Pact decision on whether to attack in the SWTVD at all. Alternatively, both sides could exercise restraint by not horizontally escalating a Central Region war into the Mediterranean unless and until combat began in one or more of the adjacent land regions.



Fig. 1.2 — The North Italian theater




Fig. 1.3 — The Balkan theater




Fig. 1.4 — The Eastern Turkish theater

II. AFSOUTH WARTIME COMMAND STRUCTURE

The AFSOUTH wartime command structure is pictured in Fig. 2.1. The Commander-in-Chief of AFSOUTH (CINCSOUTH) is a major NATO commander directly subordinate to the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR). CINCSOUTH may delegate operational control of various forces to his principal supporting commanders: Land Forces South (LANDSOUTH) for Northern Italy, Land Forces Southeast (LANDSOUTHEAST) for Turkey, Air Forces South (AIRSOUTH), Naval Forces South (NAVSOUTH), and Strike Force South (STRIKFORSOUTH). Theater tactical air forces are divided between the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) in Northern Italy and the Sixth ATAF in Turkey.

Command and control of reinforcing formations remains with SACEUR until the deployed augmenting units have been declared operationally ready. For the early phases of the campaign, in effect, this applies only to tactical air units; ground defense will be carried out largely by national ground force contingents already on the scene. Thus, since the principal land commanders and the two ATAF commanders are Italian and Turkish generals (SOUTH/5th ATAF and SOUTHEAST/7th ATAF, respectively), operational control of forces committed to defense of the two land areas is essentially in the hands of national joint commands. Defense of Greek Thrace is, by preference of the Greek government, an entirely national responsibility.

In wartime, allied naval forces would be commanded by one of seven operational commanders. The Commander, United States Sixth Fleet, would become COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, and all of that fleet's units plus all reinforcing U.S. naval forces would transfer to AFSOUTH command. The other NATO naval command positions are filled by national fleet commanders who function as area commanders subordinate to COMNAVSOUTH. Surface units assigned to protection of NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Mediterranean make up what are in reality separate Italian, Greek, and Turkish fleets. Although not under NATO command, the French Mediterranean Fleet would also contribute to SLOC security.

Allied submarines and maritime aircraft committed to NATO would be controlled by NAVSOUTH's functional commanders, Commander, Submarine Forces Mediterranean (COMSUBMED), and Commander, Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (COMMARAIMED).




Fig. 2.1 -- AFSOUTH wartime command structure

GREECE AND TURKEY

Certain political issues complicate the assemblage of Alliance resources for the defense of NATO's southern flank. The most troublesome issue is Greco-Turkish animosity and the Aegean territorial jurisdictional disputes which have been kept alive by that historical hostility. One result of this is that the Alliance can anticipate little preparation for active wartime cooperation between Greece and Turkey, and can assume wartime willingness to attempt such cooperation with little confidence. Defense of the *land areas in the Eastern Mediterranean must, therefore, be approached for planning purposes as essentially national efforts.*

SPAIN

A potential problem also exists with respect to Spanish cooperation in making available its bases to support Allied reinforcement of AFSOUTH. Lacking firm agreements yet for wartime host-nation support, or a clear picture of Spanish intentions with respect to its military role in the Alliance, planners must make cautious assumptions about these issues. The authors have assumed, for example, that Torrejon will be available for airlift staging, and that other bases will be available for tanker operations in support of tactical air and airlift deployments farther to the east.

III. WARSAW PACT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

INTRODUCTION

In a general NATO-Warsaw Pact war, it is assumed that the Pact High Command would assign its highest priority to operations opposite the Alliance's Central Region (AFCENT) in the Western Theater of Military Operations (WTVD). Its options, however, would include offensive operations in either or both of the Northwestern and Southwestern TVDs (NWTVD/SWTVD) to pin NATO forces that might otherwise be diverted to AFCENT. In this event, the Pact offensive would be met by the forces assigned to NATO's Northern and Southern Regions, AFNORTH and AFSOUTH.

WTVD, SWTVD, AND STVD

Warsaw Pact offensive operations in the SWTVD would probably make maximum use of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces available to the High Command but not otherwise useful in the West, thereby conserving some Soviet formations for duty in the WTVD. If the High Command were to activate the Southern TVD (STVD) and alert the Soviet forces in the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus military districts (MDs) for an attack on Iran, their movements might also be coordinated with mobilization in the SWTVD. In practice, it would be difficult to distinguish preparations in these MDs for an attack on Iran from aggressive intent toward Eastern Turkey unless Western intelligence could discern the pattern of Soviet force deployments with sufficient clarity.

PACT FORCES IN THE SWTVD

Soviet forces available for an offensive in the SWTVD would probably include the ground and air forces stationed in the Odessa MD. Supplementing these could be one or more combined-arms armies from the Kiev MD. Additional air forces may be assigned to the theater from the Soviet central reserves, and also through delegation of all or part of the Vinnitsa Air Army. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, Mediterranean squadron, and associated Naval Aviation units would also participate in an attack on AFSOUTH.

It is estimated that not all NSWP ground forces would be available to the SWTVD in the early days of combat. Bulgarian Army units are believed to be the most dependable in the region, and their units are maintained at the highest levels of readiness in peacetime. These forces could be committed against either Greece or Turkish Thrace, depending upon the nature of the Pact offensive in the SWTVD.

All Hungarian People's Army (HPA) units are maintained at Category II and III readiness, and would require from several days to several weeks to fill out, and draw and service their equipment. Hence, any short-mobilization SWTVD offensive through Austria would have to be carried out largely by in-place Soviet units from the Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary. Given sufficient time to prepare, it appears likely that Hungarian forces would be assigned flank security roles to protect the Pact offensive against a possible NATO counterattack from Italy.

It is estimated that the forces of the Romanian Army would not be counted on to engage in offensive operations in the SWTVD. One each of its tank and motorized-rifle divisions are rated Category I, but their equipment has not been modernized. Moreover, Romania's national mobilization system is geared more toward building up the defensive capabilities of the Patriotic Guards home-defense organization than assuring the availability of fillers and replacements for regular Army formations engaged in a joint Pact offensive. Thus, it is believed that the Warsaw Pact High Command would request Romanian cooperation only for air defense and for the protection of internal LOCs used by transiting Soviet units.

IV. BALANCE OF FORCES IN NATO'S SOUTHERN REGION

INTRODUCTION

This section generally compares the forces available to the two opposing alliances in Southern Europe. The information is intentionally presented in an aggregated form to avoid belaboring the reader's patience with the myriad details of each country's force structure, doctrine, and so forth. The purpose is to provide an overall context from which assessments of possible NATO and Warsaw Pact strategic and operational objectives and goals may be derived.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Ground force strengths are presented in equivalent divisions, or EDs. The equivalent division values for a unit are computed based upon weapon scores and counts for that unit. For example, a U.S. armored division is approximately one ED in strength,¹ whereas a Soviet motorized rifle division is about 0.65 ED.² A Greek infantry division tips the scales at about 0.35 ED, and an Italian Alpine brigade measures roughly 0.15 ED. Table 4.1 lists the staff estimates of strength in EDs for the most common unit types found in the region.

THE OPPOSING LAND AND AIR FORCES

Figure 4.1 shows that the Pact can apply about 45 EDs to operations throughout the AFSOUTH region. This number includes Soviet forces in Hungary, and the Odessa, Kiev, Transcaucasus, and North Caucasus military districts, along with the national forces of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

As the chart shows, the available forces are fairly evenly divided between Category I, II, and III units, meaning that it will take at least 30 days of mobilization and training before the full impact of these forces can be brought to bear on NATO's defenses. The Alliance's forces, although considerably fewer in number, consist of a higher proportion of ready, in-place units.


¹ Exclusive of its air defense and attack helicopter forces. ED scores will, of course, vary from unit to unit depending on each unit's mobilization level, and its unit equipment. All ED scores used in this Note are derived from unclassified sources.

² NSWP MRDs in the SWTVD typically score from 0.4-0.6 ED.


Table 4.1

ED VALUES FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT UNITS

NATO			Warsaw Pact		
US	Armored division	1.00	Soviet	Tank division	0.65
	Marine division	0.35		Motor rifle division	0.60
Greek	Armored division	0.45		Artillery division	0.40
	Infantry division	0.35		Airborne division	0.50
	Armored brigade	0.25		Air assault brigade	0.10
	Mechanized brigade	0.25		Naval infantry reg't	0.10
Italian	Alpine brigade	0.15	Hungarian	Tank division	0.60
	Armored brigade	0.30		Motor rifle division	0.50
	Mechanized brigade	0.35		Artillery division	0.10
	Motorized brigade	0.15	Romanian	Tank division	0.45
	Artillery brigade	0.20		Motor rifle division	0.50
Turkish	Mechanized division	0.70		Artillery division	0.15
	Infantry division	0.50		Infantry brigade	0.15
	Armored brigade	0.25	Bulgarian	Motor rifle division	0.40
	Mechanized brigade	0.25		Tank brigade	0.20
	Infantry brigade	0.20		Artillery division	0.10



NOTE: CAT I units are available on M-day;
CAT II units, on M+15; CAT III, M+30



NOTE: FENCERS from the Vinnitsa Air Army
and the Southern Group of Forces are
included in the Pact long-range air-to-ground
totals.

Fig. 4.1 — NATO/Pact ground and air forces

Figure 4.2 shows buildup curves for both the Warsaw Pact and NATO through the first 45 days of mobilization on each side.

The Warsaw Pact also enjoys a substantial numerical superiority in the air. The Pact figures here include the air forces from all areas mentioned above, along with over 200 FENCERS of the Vinnitsa Air Army, which constitute the bulk of the long-range strike aviation available to the Pact in this theater. Not included in these figures is the Kiev Air Defense Army.

On the NATO side, all national air forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey are included, along with approximately 17 reinforcing squadrons of U.S. tactical air. Not included is the Marine Air Wing (MAW) which would be deployed to support the U.S. Marine Division scheduled to deploy to Thrace; nor is the carrier-based aviation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet included in the count.³

Both NATO and the Pact are modernizing their air forces in the region. Italy continues to take delivery on *Tornado* strike aircraft and will shortly begin receiving the Italo-Brazilian AMX attack aircraft to begin replacing its aging inventory of G-91 light bombers. Both Greece and Turkey are meanwhile procuring the F-16 fighter-bomber from the United States; the former also has on order 40 French *Mirage 2000* aircraft.

On the Pact side, regiments of FULCRUM multipurpose fighters have appeared in Hungary and the Transcaucasus MD, with more deployments expected.

Both Bulgaria and Hungary have deployed squadrons of Su-25 FROGFOOT close-support aircraft, and both countries continue to acquire later-model FLOGGER fighters. Romania, the most poorly equipped Pact member, is buying over 100 additional IAR-93 light attack aircraft to replace its fleet of obsolete MiG-17 FRESCO fighter-bombers.

As was noted above, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have to deal with intra-alliance political difficulties in Southern Europe: NATO must tread warily around enduring Greco-Turkish disputes, and Moscow confronts a strategically located but reluctant and uncooperative ally in Romania.

Figure 4.3 breaks down the EDs available to each alliance by country of origin. Of interest is the overwhelming disparity between the Soviet and American commitments to

³ These forces, which might total upward of 200 combat aircraft, were excluded because of uncertainty regarding their numbers and availability.




Fig. 4.2 -- NATO/Pact buildup curves

the theater. Over two-thirds of the total ground forces potentially available to the SWTVD commander are Soviet, whereas only about 2 percent of NATO's land forces are American.

Also worth noting is the sizable contribution Romanian forces make to the total threat: the Romanian Army accounts for more EDs than either Hungary or Bulgaria.

Figure 4.4 depicts the relative weight of national contributions to available theater air power. It shows that the American contribution in this category is dramatically higher than it is for ground forces. Given that much of the current inventories of the Greek and Turkish air forces are older, less-capable aircraft, the impact of higher-quality U.S. forces is even greater than the raw numbers indicate.

On the Pact side, we again see both the predominant role of Soviet forces and the surprisingly large Romanian force, which once more is the largest of the NSWP contingents. In general, however, the NSWP air forces are geared toward air defense and are entirely lacking in long-range striking power.

RELATIVE LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

For both alliances, logistics are the responsibility of each individual member nation. Overall, the Warsaw Pact has the advantage in this area for three reasons.




Fig. 4.3 — NATO/Pact EDs by nationality

First, the Pact maintains a generally higher level of sustainability, probably twice that of NATO. The staff estimates that NATO can sustain intensive combat operations throughout the theater for 10-15 days, while the Pact has at least 25-30 days of capability. Perhaps equally important, NATO's stocks of sophisticated, modern munitions are probably insufficient for even 10 days of high-tempo combat.

Second, the Pact possesses internal lines of communication. This means that they can shift available supplies from one part of the theater to another more easily than can NATO.

Finally, the Pact has a much greater degree of commonality in its military equipment and weapons. Thus, ammunition, spares, and support equipment stocked by one nation can be used, if necessary, to supply the needs of another's forces; CINCSOUTH lacks this flexibility.

NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have substantial nuclear capabilities available for use on the Southern Flank. Approximately 1,200 nuclear warheads are available in Italy, Greece, and Turkey for use by both U.S. and national forces. All three countries own 155/203mm artillery capable of delivering nuclear rounds; Italy in addition is equipped with a half-dozen Lance surface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchers. Nuclear-




Fig. 4.4 — NATO/Pact tacair by nationality

capable aircraft deployed by these countries include the *Tornado* (Italy), the F-104 (all three), F-4E (Greece and Turkey), and the F-16 (Greece and Turkey).

Several hundred Soviet nuclear warheads are stored in Hungary, the only NSWP country on the Southern Flank where such weapons can be found; there are also numerous storage sites in the Kiev, Odessa, and Transcaucasus MDs. All four Pact armies are equipped with nuclear-capable artillery and FROG and SCUD SSMs. The Soviet Air Forces in the SWTVD are equipped with nuclear strike aircraft such as FITTER and FENCER; in addition, long-range nuclear strike assets such as BACKFIRE bombers from the Moscow Air Army could be brought to bear.

Figures 4.5 and 4.6 summarize the staff estimates of Warsaw Pact and NATO chemical warfare capability in the Southern Region. Note that NATO's meager defensive resources are far overmatched by the offensive chemical capability of the Warsaw Pact.





Fig. 4.5 — Warsaw Pact chemical warfare capabilities

NAVAL FORCES

Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO deploy formidable naval forces in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas. For NATO, control of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Mediterranean is vital to maintaining the integrity of the Alliance, whereas the Pact will likely aim both to disrupt the SLOCs and to eliminate the nuclear strike threat presented by the large-deck aircraft carriers and cruise-missile-equipped surface ships and submarines of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

Typical peacetime dispositions of the Soviet and U.S. navies in the Mediterranean and Black Seas are shown in Table 4.2, and the composition of their allied navies can be found in Table 4.3. In general, the striking power of the two sides is concentrated in the naval forces of the two superpowers. However, all of the allied navies, both NATO and Pact, are equipped with missile attack craft which, while not "blue-water" offensive forces, could do significant damage to amphibious landing groups or smaller task forces and convoy escort groups. Also, as Table 4.3 shows, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish navies deploy a significant number of submarines.

Both the Turks and Greeks are modernizing their fleets with new submarines and frigates; the latter vessels are equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles.



Estimates of NATO
Defensive Capabilities

	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Excellent</u>
Turkey	X		
Greece	X		
Italy	X		
United States		X	

The staff does not rate NATO's offensive or defensive capabilities in the region very highly. Although the United States resumed production of chemical weapons in November 1987, the small quantities produced will have no discernible impact on this theater of operations.

Fig. 4.6 — NATO chemical warfare capabilities

NATO forces in the Mediterranean would be further augmented in wartime by the presence of the French Mediterranean Fleet. On average, this fleet deploys two aircraft carriers, a cruiser, five destroyers, and a half-dozen frigates. In addition, the French maintain up to 10 submarines in the Mediterranean, including two of their *Rubis*-class nuclear submarines. The maintenance of SLOC security in the western Mediterranean would be a French responsibility in the event of a general NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

The Italian navy, with its two helicopter carriers, would have principal responsibility for SLOC defense in the mid-Mediterranean, and the U.S. Sixth Fleet, acting as NATOSTRIKFORSOUTH, would shoulder those responsibilities in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek and Turkish navies would patrol the Aegean, and the latter would be charged with the defense of the Turkish Black Sea coast and the security of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Both alliances maintain considerable mine warfare and mine countermeasures capabilities in the Mediterranean region, as Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 depict. In the event of war, it is likely that both sides would choose to mine certain key points, such as the

Table 4.2

U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

Type	U.S. Sixth Fleet	Soviet Black Sea Fleet	Soviet Fifth Eskadra
Aircraft carrier	2	0	0
Helicopter carrier	0	2	0
Guided-missile cruiser	4	6	1
Gun (ASW) cruiser	0	4	0
Guided-missile destroyer	2	7	2
Gun (ASW) destroyer	4	6	2
Guided-missile frigate	2	4	1
Gun (ASW) frigate	2	2	2
Light frigate	0	35	4
Cruise missile sub (nuclear)	0	0	1
Cruise missile sub (diesel)	0	3	2
Attack sub (nuclear)	4	0	6
Attack sub (diesel)	0	18	6

Table 4.3


NSWP AND NON-U.S. NATO NAVAL FORCES

Type	Greece	Italy	Turkey	Bulgaria	Romania
CVH	0	2	0	0	0
CG	0	2	0	0	0
DDG	0	4	0	0	2
DD	14	0	13	0	0
FFG	2	0	0	0	0
FF	2	16	7	3	3
FAC-M	14	7	14	7	6
SS	8	11	17	4	1

FAC-M—fast missile attack boat (e.g., OSA)

Turkish Straits: NATO, to keep the Soviet Black Sea Fleet bottled up in its home waters, the Soviets to prevent NATO surface forces and submarines, assumed to be armed with nuclear weapons, from entering the Black Sea and threatening the homeland.

Turkish Straits: NATO, to keep the Soviet Black Sea Fleet bottled up in its home waters, the Soviets to prevent NATO surface forces and submarines, assumed to be armed with nuclear weapons, from entering the Black Sea and threatening the homeland.



<u>Delivery</u>	<u>Countermeasures</u>			
200,000-300,000 mines	Black Sea		Mediterranean Sea	
Moored contact	MCM vessels		MCM vessels	
Acoustic	USSR	65	USSR	2 (usually)
Magnetic	Bulgaria	24		
Pressure	Romania	45		
Rising mines (e.g., CAPTOR)	MCM helicopters			
Air-, surface-, and submarine-delivered	USSR	19		

Fig. 4.7 — Warsaw Pact mine warfare capabilities

Table 4.4

NATO MINE WARFARE CAPABILITY

	France	Italy	Greece	Turkey
Ocean minehunters	5	0	0	0
Ocean minesweepers	0	4	14	0
Coastal minehunters	20	12	0	0
Coastal minesweepers	0	7	0	22
Minelayers	0	0	2	7

Minesweepers are less sophisticated ships, generally only capable against moored mines. Minehunters have more electronics and are more versatile. As of Spring 1988, Italy had three minesweepers and France three minehunters deployed to the Persian Gulf.

V. THE NORTH ITALIAN THEATER

GROUND FORCES

Figure 5.1 shows the numbers and nationalities of ground forces likely to be employed in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack on northern Italy. On the Pact side, the Hungarian forces, organized into two armies, are the most likely participants. They could be used to come across Yugoslavia into northeastern Italy as part of a general offensive in AFSOUTH; alternatively, they might be employed to guard the southern and western flanks of a Soviet thrust through Austria into the southern parts of the FRG. The Soviet Southern Group of Forces would most likely be employed in the Central Region, but it could be used against AFSOUTH both to pin Italian forces and threaten southern France with a thrust westward across Austria.

In Italy, the Alpine Corps is deployed to defend the approaches through the mountains in the north, while a heavier, mechanized corps shields the Gorizia corridor along the Adriatic. Defense of the peninsula is entrusted to two motorized and two mechanized brigades. A third, mechanized corps is also available.

Figure 5.2 shows the number of EDs available to each side, broken out by nationality and readiness category.

AIR FORCES

Italy's air force is fairly evenly divided between short-range air-to-ground aircraft like the G-91Y, air-to-air interceptors (F-104S, with Sparrow AAM capability), and longer-range interdictors (the *Tornado*). The latter type gives the Italians the ability to strike targets as distant as Bavaria and western Czechoslovakia. In addition, about six squadrons of USAF reinforcements are slated to deploy to Italy in the early days of a crisis; the bulk of these are to be F-4 and F-16 multirole fighters.

Hungary's air force is almost exclusively composed of interceptors, primarily FISHBED; its only air-to-ground capability consists of a single squadron of FROGFOOT close air support (CAS) aircraft.

The Soviets have about 240 combat aircraft deployed in Hungary, including a regiment of FULCRUM. Also present is a regiment of FENCER long-range strike aircraft.




Fig. 5.1 — Italian and Pact forces in the theater

LOGISTICS

The Warsaw Pact has built an extensive support network in Hungary that appears capable of supporting either a thrust to the north and west into Germany, an attack on Italy, or both simultaneously. Stocks for up to 45 days of combat are readily available, and the short land lines of communication into the western Soviet Union would make resupply fairly easy; forward movement into combat zones could be trying, particularly if NATO is capable of mounting an air interdiction campaign of any strength.

Italy is as well-provided for as any AFSOUTH country, with stocks for 15-20 days of combat on hand. However, as is true throughout the region, there are shortages of modern munitions, particularly sophisticated air-to-ground weapons. Resupply either by land across France or through the western Mediterranean Sea will be limited primarily by the availability of air and sea lift to move supplies and equipment from the CONUS to the theater; for the most part, the Italians will have to fight with their peacetime stocks alone.




Fig. 5.2 — EDs by category, North Italian theater

THEATER SUMMARY

Italy is probably better prepared, given the threat it faces, than any other NATO member; that is, unlike objectively stronger countries like West Germany, its forces appear adequate to resist the limited attacks it should expect to face. The interposition of neutral Yugoslavia and Austria between it and the Warsaw Pact would increase the warning time available to Rome, and the limited number of approaches in the north would channel any enemy offensive. The primary challenge facing NATO in this theater is to win the battle for air superiority quickly so as to be able to use both Italian and U.S. air assets either to support the Italian army in a defense of the homeland or to interdict Pact forces attacking in Austria, Yugoslavia, or southern Germany.

VI. THRACE AND THE BALKANS

GROUND FORCES

Figure 6.1 shows the ground forces of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the Balkans region.¹ As the figure shows, the Pact can apply substantially more force in this theater than was the case in Italy. Bulgaria fields three armies, and the Soviets can form two combined-arms armies from the Odessa Military District, and up to four more from the Kiev MD. Should they fight side-by-side with their Pact allies, Romania could add two additional armies to their total.

On the NATO side, Greece deploys two corps to defend Macedonia and western Thrace; these are for the most part the highest-quality and best-equipped units in the Greek Army. Defense of the Turkish Thrace is delegated to one (of four) Turkish armies; a second is deployed in western Anatolia. Figure 6.2 shows the approximate forces available to each side from the beginning of mobilization through M+45 days. It reveals that NATO has an early advantage in numbers which is quickly and decisively eradicated as Soviet forces from the southwestern USSR deploy into the arena.

AIR FORCES

Both Bulgaria and Romania have air forces dedicated primarily to air defense and equipped mainly with older types of Soviet aircraft. Bulgaria's six regiments are two-thirds interceptor types, with FISHBED predominating; the only modern air-to-ground aircraft in the inventory are 60 short-range FLOGGER and FROGFOOT.

Romania's air force, although numerically much larger, is poorly equipped. Its 14 air-defense squadrons are composed almost entirely of older-model FISHBED; FRESCO and a limited number of indigenous IAR-93 *Orao* provide very limited ground-support capability.

The Soviet Union has no aircraft forward-deployed in either Bulgaria or Romania, and the Air Armies of the Odessa and Kiev MDs are not particularly large, having a total of about 270 aircraft. However, the Vinnitsa Air Army, which has its headquarters in the

¹ Not included are the U.S. Marine division scheduled to deploy to the theater, or the Naval Infantry regiment assigned to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.



Fig. 6.1 — Thrace and the Balkans

southwestern USSR, is a powerful formation equipped with over 200 FENCER. If the Soviet General Staff commits all or a portion of the Vinnitsa Air Army to support an attack on Thrace, NATO's air defense problems could be substantial; the total of Warsaw Pact aircraft committed to this theater could exceed 1,000.

In addition, the Soviet ground forces opposite Thrace deploy more than 300 helicopters, including about 150 modern attack craft. These assets could play a key role in a Pact offensive by providing the Soviet commander with superior tactical mobility and a source of flexible firepower. Neither the Turkish nor Greek armies are particularly well-equipped to combat this rotary-wing threat.




Fig. 6.2 — EDs available in Thrace and the Balkans




Fig. 6.3 — Pact EDs by nationality, Balkan theater

Finally, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet possesses some 125 BADGER and BACKFIRE maritime strike aircraft. Operating in conjunction with surface ships and submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean, these aircraft, all of which can carry long-range anti-ship missiles, would represent a serious threat to NATO naval forces operating in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean seas.

The Greek and Turkish air forces deployed in this region are, like their non-Soviet Pact adversaries, sizable, but equipped principally with older-model aircraft. The two

countries combined would commit about 250 aircraft to the region; roughly 90 are F-4 fighters, along with 50 A-7 attack aircraft. The rest are a mix of less capable F-104 and F-5 fighter-bombers.

Only two reinforcing USAF squadrons are expected in the Balkan theater, one of which is composed of A-10s, the other of F-16s. However, a full Marine Air Wing (MAW) would accompany the U.S. Marine forces into the theater. The MAW would be likely to include two squadrons of F/A-18 multipurpose fighter-bombers as well as a squadron of A-6 interdictors. Also, should the Soviets launch a major attack aimed at the capture of the Turkish Straits, some or all of the air assets deployed on the carriers of the U.S. Sixth Fleet could be used in support of the allied defense.

LOGISTICS

Neither NATO nor the Pact can be completely sanguine about their logistics arrangements in this theater. Both Turkey and Greece suffer from serious shortages of ammunition, spare parts, and logistics transport, and substantial intrawar resupply is unlikely. Neither country will likely be able to sustain large-scale combat operations for more than 15 days.

The Pact possesses adequate stocks for 25-35 days of offensive activity; however, their rear-area land lines of communication are relatively sparse and not particularly robust. Also complicating matters are the potentially recalcitrant Romanians, whose territory lies between the southwestern Soviet Union and the front. Thus, the Pact is likely to rely upon riverine and maritime LOCs for much of its rear-area logistical movement; movement of supplies into forward areas will be hampered by poor terrain, poor regional transportation infrastructure, and NATO interdiction.

The Soviets plan to make extensive use of the sea LOC from the Crimea to the Black Sea ports in Bulgaria; in addition to supplies, large formations of troops can be accommodated on the huge barges that would ply this route. Also, the Danube River could be employed to move forces and equipment in the theater.

THEATER SUMMARY

The battle for the Turkish Straits would be a crucial struggle in any general NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. NATO's advantages include the terrain, which in much of the theater would inhibit rapid movement by massed, mechanized forces, and the relatively low quality of its Bulgarian and Romanian opponents. The Pact, on the other hand, can over time attain a fairly large superiority in men and materiel; this could wear

the Alliance down, particularly given the shortage of logistic support that NATO is likely to face.

An important "x-factor" in this theater is Romania. As Fig. 6.3 shows, slightly more than one-fifth of the Pact's ground-combat potential is Romanian. Should the Romanians choose not to join in a Pact offensive against Greece and Turkey, NATO's defensive task will be made significantly easier. Given their likely role as a second- or third-echelon force, however, the absence of active Romanian cooperation would not preclude a powerful Pact thrust toward the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

VII. EASTERN TURKEY

GROUND FORCES

The forces on each side in eastern Turkey are shown in Fig. 7.1. Soviet forces deployed opposite NATO here would be drawn largely from the three combined arms armies of the Transcaucasus Military District; some reinforcement from the North Caucasus MD is possible. The total EDs available to each side are shown in Fig. 7.2.

The Third Turkish Army is the primary defending force. Headquartered in Erzinjan, the Third Army deploys roughly 11 brigades across the traditional invasion routes along the coast and through the Karasu-Aras Mountain passes. Both the Soviet and Turkish forces are, in peacetime, maintained at fairly low states of readiness. The Turks rely on a local mobilization system, which they believe will allow them to bring their formations to combat readiness rapidly in the event of war.

AIR FORCES

Turkey deploys approximately 180 aircraft in the eastern half of the country, primarily interceptors and air-to-air fighters. Except for 20 F-16s and 30 F-4s, however, this force is made up entirely of outdated F-100, F-104, and F-5 fighter-bombers.

This area is host to several bases that would be used by the USAF in wartime. Nine U.S. squadrons are assigned to operations in this theater, including F-15 fighters and F-111 strike aircraft. The latter would provide CINCSOUTH with a deep-attack nuclear threat against the Soviet homeland.

On the Soviet side, almost 500 tactical aircraft can be brought to bear, including modern FULCRUM, FENCER, and FROGFOOT types. Unusually for a Soviet Military District, the majority of the aircraft stationed in the Transcaucasus are ground-attack and strike platforms; this may indicate that the Air Army is meant principally for operations against Iran, and its relatively weak air force, rather than Turkey. In either case, reinforcement from other Military Districts or Moscow's Strategic Reserve would be required if the Soviets anticipated opposition from U.S. air forces.




Fig. 7.1 — Ground forces in Eastern Turkey

LOGISTICS

Once again, the Soviets possess a decided logistical advantage in this theater. Whereas Turkish forces stationed in the region stand at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communication from ports and depots in the south and west, the Soviets can operate along their interior lines and thereby swing forces and supplies from point to point with relative ease. However, should they advance deeply into Turkey, Soviet forces would begin to suffer from overextension of their supply lines across inhospitable terrain inhabited by a population not well-disposed toward Russians under the best of circumstances.

The staff estimates that the Soviets can operate for 20-30 days in a high-tempo environment while, without external resupply, the Turks will begin to suffer serious shortfalls after 10-15 days.




Fig. 7.2 — EDs in Eastern Turkey

THEATER SUMMARY

The terrain in this theater makes it a highly favorable one for the defender. Any attacker would be channeled into a handful of known and defensible approaches, and the Soviets would probably be unable to exploit their impressive advantage in armor and mechanization. The staff assesses the most likely action here to be Soviet pinning attacks to protect the flanks of either an assault on western Turkey and Thrace or an invasion of Iran.

VIII. AN AFSOUTH CAMPAIGN PLAN

SITUATION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a defensive Alliance that maintains military preparedness to prevent war. Its role is to safeguard the security of member states by deterring aggression.

In the event of aggression, the role of the Alliance is to re-establish the territorial integrity of the North Atlantic area. To this end, NATO possesses military forces made up of three interlocking elements, known as the NATO Triad. They are:

- Conventional forces strong enough to resist and repel a conventional attack on a limited scale, and to sustain a conventional defense in the forward areas against large-scale conventional aggression;
- Intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces to enhance the deterrent and, if necessary, the defensive efforts of NATO's conventional forces against a conventional attack, to deter and defend against an attack with nuclear forces of the same kind(s), and to provide a linkage to the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance; and
- The strategic nuclear forces of the United States, and Great Britain, which provide the ultimate deterrent capability of the Alliance.

ENEMY FORCES

Enemy forces will include Warsaw Pact naval and air forces, and ground forces capable of attacking Northern Italy, Greco-Turkish Thrace, and Eastern Turkey.

FRIENDLY FORCES

This plan uses NATO-committed forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as augmentation forces from the United States. In time of war, CINCSOUTH will likely have French naval forces available to support some aspects of his operations. Also, Spanish forces may be made available to him.

ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions have been made in the preparation of this plan:

- The member nations of NATO will respond in a timely manner to indications of an impending attack by the Warsaw Pact and implement the appropriate alert and mobilization measures. This assumption is critical not only for this plan but for the effectiveness of a conventional defense of the region.
- Pursuant to the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, an attack against any member of the Alliance will constitute an attack on the Alliance as a whole and forces of Alliance members may be involved in repulsing it.
- A minimum of 10 days of warning of an impending Warsaw Pact attack is assumed.

MISSION

CINCSOUTH's mission is to maintain the integrity of NATO territory. In addition, SACEUR has directed that planning include a defense of the SLOCs throughout the Mediterranean Sea.

OPERATIONS

Concept

The broad concept of the campaign is to defend well forward, to fight the air and naval battles to win sea control and air superiority, and to conduct a successful conventional defense of all NATO territory within the region.

Phase I: Deployment and Deterrence

The objective of this phase is to deter aggression through the demonstration of NATO's resolve and capabilities. This will involve the mobilization and deployment of Alliance combat and logistic-support forces.

During this phase, U.S. augmentation forces will be deployed to the AFSOUTH area, and Alliance naval forces will deploy to their operating areas in the Mediterranean Sea and contiguous waters. "Hostile Intent" rules of engagement will be observed. In addition, Alliance ground forces will mobilize, train, and occupy defensive positions in accordance with CINCSOUTH's defense plan, while air forces will deploy to their wartime operating locations.

Phase II: Sea-Control/Air-Superiority

The objective of this phase of Allied operations is to defeat Warsaw Pact attempts to cripple the combat capability of STRIKFORSOUTH and to defend successfully against enemy efforts to neutralize Allied land-based air assets in the AFSOUTH area.

This phase will begin with the commencement of hostilities in the AFSOUTH region and may be conducted in advance of or in conjunction with territorial defense of NATO territory in the area. Specific operational tasks in this phase include:

- Air forces:

- Detect and intercept Warsaw Pact aircraft intruding in NATO airspace and threatening Allied land, air, and naval forces and installations.
- Attain local air superiority in the vicinity of major Allied installations and along attack corridors leading to Allied fleet operating areas.
- Attack and destroy or neutralize enemy naval forces operating in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.
- As situation permits, and as authorized by the responsible political and military authorities, shift available forces to attack Warsaw Pact operating bases in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the southern and southwestern Soviet Union, and other territories as required.

- Naval forces:

- Attack and destroy enemy naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean
- Defend against concentrated enemy attacks, including attacks by Soviet Naval Aviation, and destroy enemy capability to mount such operations.

- Ground forces:

- Defend key surface installations and facilities against enemy air attack
- Continue local buildup of forces necessary for ground defense in the event of an enemy attack.

Phase III: Territorial Defense

The objective of this phase of Allied operations is to exercise the combined combat capabilities of NATO's land, sea, and air forces to defend the designated land

areas in Northern Italy, Greco-Turkish Thrace, and Eastern Turkey as they may be subjected to enemy attack. The principal area for defense is Turkish Thrace because of its commanding influence on control of the Turkish Straits and hence on enemy access to the Aegean and Mediterranean seas.

Given that the enemy has the initiative as to the timing of his attack, it is possible that this phase will be executed in conjunction with Phase I described above.

Specific operational tasks in this phase include:

- Air forces:

- Conduct offensive and defensive counterair operations to deny air support to attacking Warsaw Pact ground forces.
- Attack enemy amphibious forces involved in landing operations on the northern Turkish coast.
- Attack and destroy inbound airborne and air-assault forces throughout the AFSOUTH area.
- Interdict marshalling yards and other choke points along the lines of communication of attacking Warsaw Pact forces.

- Naval forces:

- Destroy remaining Warsaw Pact surface and submarine assets in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.
- Attack amphibious forces assembling and moving toward landing zones on the northern Turkish shore.
- Continue defensive operations against enemy air threats that evade land-based Allied air defenses.
- Conduct active surveillance against subsurface and air threats to Mediterranean SLOCs.

- Ground forces:

- Pursuant to CINCSOUTH's defensive plan, conduct forward defensive operations to deny Warsaw Pact forces effective access to main avenues of advance into NATO areas subjected to attack, i.e., northern Italy, Greco-Turkish Thrace, and eastern Turkey.
- Provide local air defense for Allied forces.

LOGISTICS

Within NATO, logistics are a national responsibility; SACEUR's authority in this area is limited, and intratheater mobility assets are limited within the AFSOUTH area. With the exception of U.S. supplies for committed U.S. forces, therefore, the national forces in the AFSOUTH area will be required to fight with the logistics and support capabilities they have on hand at the commencement of hostilities.

Some movement of fuel, food, and medical supplies will be possible, but ammunition resupply will be the focus of Allied logistic efforts.

CINCSOUTH will be able to conduct high-intensity conventional operations for approximately 10 days.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

In conduct of defensive operations against the Warsaw Pact, AFSOUTH will:

- Direct and coordinate regional air defenses and deployment of fighter-interceptor resources;
- Coordinate national deployments of ground-based anti-air defenses to assure adequate concentration along attack corridors used in the Warsaw Pact air campaign against targets in the AFSOUTH area;
- Direct and coordinate Allied naval operations throughout the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas;
- As they become available, allocate reinforcement resources among different elements of the regional defense efforts;
- Coordinate nationally directed ground defense efforts and request the transfer or redeployment of national forces as they may be needed in other regional defense sectors;
- Furnish intelligence information to subordinate commanders and to national command headquarters.

In conduct of defensive operations against the Warsaw Pact, regional component commanders will:

- Direct employment of allocated forces in pursuit of assigned objectives;

- Continually re-assess emerging resource requirements and request augmentation as dictated by the changing combat situation;
- Collect combat intelligence data and provide it to higher headquarters.

Activities and dispositions of Allied naval forces in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas will be coordinated by Commander, STRIKFORSOUTH, during the first four phases of the campaign. Naval forces in other areas of the Mediterranean will remain under the control of NAVSOUTH and his subregional force commanders at all times.

Commander, LANDSOUTHEAST, will be responsible primarily for the defense of Turkish Thrace and the Straits and will control all forces committed to that defense. Ground force operations in defense of other land areas in LANDSOUTHEAST, will be directed primarily by national authorities. Through Commander, 6th ATAF, Commander, LANDSOUTHEAST, will coordinate the allocation and employment of air assets among the different defense zones.

LANDSOUTH and LANDSOUTHEAST commanders will maintain closest coordination with national commands as regards the allocation of ground forces to defensive operations within their respective areas of responsibility.

IX. SWTVD CAMPAIGN PLAN¹

SITUATION

The Warsaw Pact is a defensive alliance. If a war with NATO is inevitable, however, conditions may dictate that we initiate offensive operations.

Key to the success of any European war against NATO is synchronizing the efforts of the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (NWTVD), the Western Theater of Military Operations (WTVD), and the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations (SWTVD).

In a war against NATO, it is assumed that the WTVD is the theater of highest priority. All other considerations will be secondary to the attainment of victory in that theater.

ENEMY FORCES

NATO forces from Italy, Greece, Turkey, and afloat in the Mediterranean, as well as augmentation units from the United States, may be employed against us in the SWTVD. Although these forces represent a significant capability, NATO has several weaknesses. Among these are:

- Political difficulties between Greece and Turkey;
- Limited combat sustainability;
- Vulnerability of oil flows through the Mediterranean.

FRIENDLY FORCES

This plan uses forces allocated to the SWTVD. These include all forces in the Odessa and Transcaucasus Military Districts (MDs) of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet and associated aviation and naval infantry units, and all Bulgarian forces. In addition, at least two combined-arms armies from the Kiev MD will be made available upon mobilization. Some or all of the Vinnitsa Air Army may also be delegated to the SWTVD.

¹ This section purports to represent an actual Warsaw Pact operations plan as opposed to a Western estimate. To help maintain this fiction in the reader's mind, we have used the first person plural throughout.

The armed forces of Romania are not expected to be committed to our control for this campaign and are not employed in this plan. This plan assumes, however, that fraternal Warsaw Pact forces will be allowed unimpeded transit across Romanian territory.

The plan does not include invasion or occupation of Yugoslavia.

MISSION

During the early stages of a war with NATO, the SWTVD would constitute a secondary theater. During this period, the objective of its operations will be to defend the flank of the offensive operations in the WTVD.

If such a conflict were to continue and remain conventional in nature, operations in the WTVD would lessen in intensity for a brief period to allow Warsaw Pact forces to reorganize and recommit to further offensive action. With this pause, the SWTVD would assume additional importance. The primary objectives of offensive operations in this theater would be to:

- Disrupt NATO's military-political unity;
- Deny or restrict NATO access to the Eastern Mediterranean;
- Occupy the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean littoral; and
- Restrict or deny NATO access to Persian Gulf oil.

Subsequent objectives would be to seize control of the Eastern Mediterranean and to provide a SLOC to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.²

OPERATIONS

This campaign will be conducted in five phases:

- Crisis and attack preparation
- Defense and denial
- Battle for the Dardanelles
- Consolidation
- Breakout

² Michael McGwire discusses a similar strategy in his book *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Brookings, 1987); the authors acknowledge their debt to his inspiration.

CONTINGENCIES

Two contingencies will change this plan. If NATO uses, or begins preparing for the use of weapons of mass destruction against forces in the WTVD, we will immediately initiate use of such means in this theater. Second, if circumstances make such action necessary or desirable, forces from the SWTVD may be resubordinated to the STVD for operations in Iran. We recognize that our forces and support structure are inadequate to support full-scale attacks on both Iran and Turkey; therefore, should the decision be made to attack Iran, that operation will assume priority over this plan.

PHASE I: CRISIS AND ATTACK PREPARATION

Estimate and Objectives

One of the major vulnerabilities of NATO opposite the SWTVD is the political weakness of the Western Alliance. During a period of crisis, NATO can probably be weakened if the United States can be made to appear irrational, or if we can make it appear as though the United States is forcing NATO into an unnecessary war with the socialist countries.

Based upon this, the objectives of the first phase are as follows:

- Mobilize Warsaw Pact forces;
- Begin movement and prepositioning;
- Weaken NATO through political maneuver and diversion;
- Discourage NATO mobilization and force deployments.

Tasks

Mobilization and movement of ground forces must be done with great secrecy. In the initial phase of a war with NATO, we wish to seem nonthreatening to the governments of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Also, as it will not be possible to hide preparations in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), NATO will focus its attentions there. We will also make a feint toward Iran to induce the United States to send forces to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas.

In addition, we will attempt to increase tensions in the Persian Gulf, and exacerbate NATO's internal political turmoil.

During this phase we are especially interested in strengthening relations with Greece, Yugoslavia, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and if possible, Egypt.

Naval Operations

At the beginning of hostilities with NATO we expect that enemy navies will attempt to use their superior striking power to eliminate our forces from the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. A more limited naval presence in the Mediterranean during Phase I will contribute to our objective of not threatening NATO members in the region, as well as limiting the potential for major initial losses at sea. Those forces remaining in the Mediterranean will serve to provide reconnaissance on NATO naval movements during the prewar phase.

Deployments to the Mediterranean during this phase will be:

- One antiship rocket cruiser (normal deployment is two);
- One destroyer (normal is two);
- Two guided missile frigates (normal is three);
- Fifteen fleet auxiliaries (normal is 22);
- Ten submarines (normal is six)

We also intend to deploy large numbers of land-based antiship missiles to Libya during this phase. Although we will attempt to make these moves secretly, American discovery of the activity will not be wholly negative; any action by the United States against Libya at this point would highlight to other NATO nations the danger of being dragged into an unwanted and unnecessary war.

Air Operations

Normal training schedules will be followed for Soviet and fraternal air forces.

Ground Operations

Mobilization, call-up of civilian transport, and intensive training of Category II and III formations will begin 15 days before the onset of hostilities in the WTVD.

PHASE II: DEFENSE AND DENIAL

Transition

This phase will begin upon the commencement of hostilities in the WTVD.

Estimate and Objectives

Although we must secure the flank of our primary attack against the NATO Central Region, it is not to our benefit to launch major operations in two theaters of operations simultaneously. In addition, by not appearing overly aggressive in the SWTVD, it may still be possible to separate some NATO countries from that Alliance's war effort.

Based upon this, the objectives in phase II are as follows:

- Protect the flank of the WTVD against possible NATO air or land countermoves from Italy or elsewhere;
- Delay major conflict in the SWTVD while preparing for offensive operations;
- Using forces in Libya, begin harassment of NATO shipping in the Mediterranean;

Naval Operations

We will immediately mine the Bosphorus and seal the Black Sea against NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean. In addition, we will conduct low-signature mining operations in the Red Sea, along the approaches to the Suez Canal, and in the Persian Gulf.

Warsaw Pact surface combatants will seek haven in friendly or neutral ports when hostilities begin in the WTVD. This should demonstrate our peaceful intentions, tie down NATO naval units in surveillance, and possibly tempt the United States into widening the war. The ideal situation would be for Greece to declare neutrality and allow our ships to make port there.

Submarines are a wasting asset; once we initiate offensive operations with them, we can expect to begin incurring significant losses. Therefore, to maintain our strength for later and more crucial stages in the war, friendly submarines will defend and evade NATO ASW operations.

Harassing attacks from Libya against NATO shipping transiting the Strait of Sicily will begin with this phase.

Air Operations

Tactical air operations will be strictly defensive in nature. No cross-border operations or attacks on enemy naval targets will be permitted.

Ground Operations

On D-day in the WTVD, the Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary will attack into Austria, hooking northward into West Germany to become the southern arm of an envelopment of NATO's Central Army Group. Hungarian forces subordinated to the SWTVD will also penetrate Austria to the southwest, securing the SGF's southern flank and defending against any NATO counterattack from Italy.

Bulgarian forces will assume defensive positions along the border with Greece and Turkey. Soviet forces allocated to the SWTVD will begin deploying into the theater at the beginning of this phase. Forces of the Transcaucasus MD will play a deception role in this phase by making apparent preparations for offensive operations into Iran.

PHASE III: THE BATTLE FOR THE DARDANELLES

Transition

Should our attack in the WTVD encounter unexpectedly strong resistance, we may be forced to pause after approximately 15 days of combat to reorganize and replenish our forces there. To increase the pressure on NATO during this time, the main attack in the SWTVD will begin then. Thus, the initiation of offensive operations in the SWTVD is planned for D+15 days. If NATO begins to conduct cross-border offensive operations in advance of that date, the air and naval portions of this phase would begin immediately, with the ground offensive starting as soon as the necessary forces are in place.

The key to success in this operation is the capture of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and the eventual occupation of the entire Aegean littoral.

Estimate and Objectives

The early phases of this plan aimed at isolating the countries in the region politically. Here we begin their military neutralization. We intend to defeat the members of NATO individually, taking advantage of their lack of mutual support.

Based upon this, the objectives for this phase are as follows:

- Destroy Turkish forces in the Black Sea and Turkish Thrace;
- Seize control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Naval Operations

Naval forces will be used to isolate Thrace to the extent possible from NATO naval capabilities.

First priority targets will be NATO carriers; where necessary, their escorting vessels will be eliminated to facilitate attack on the primary targets. Long-range naval aviation and tactical aviation will be used against these targets.

Surface combatants will remain in port, continuing to tie up portions of NATO's navies. Submarines will begin an aggressive antiship campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean, and extensive use will be made of remaining missiles in Libya. Harassing mining will be carried out in the Aegean Sea by Naval Aviation and submarines.

Air Operations

The first priority targets for Warsaw Pact tactical air will be NATO's air defense capabilities, including interceptor aircraft, in and around Turkey. Attacks will be focused and intensive, taking advantage of NATO's inability to concentrate forces in response.

The Bulgarian Air Force will provide local air defense and ground support for engaged forces along the main axes of attack.

Ground Operations

Warsaw Pact forces will continue defensive operations against Italy along the Austrian border. On WTVD D+15 days, the following ground attacks, shown in Fig. 9.1, will begin:

- In eastern Turkey, two combined-arms armies from the Transcaucasus MD will strike along two axes to pin defending Turkish land and air forces in place.
- In Greece, one Bulgarian army and one combined-arms army from the Odessa MD will attack along the Sturma and Vardar River approaches toward Thessaloniki to secure the flank of the main attack and gain access to the Aegean coast.




Fig. 9.1— Axes of advance for Phase III

- The main attack will be mounted by one Bulgarian army, one Soviet army from the Odessa MD, and two armies from the Kiev MD. This attack will be on two corridors across Turkish Thrace toward the Bosphorus.

Operations against Turkish Thrace will be supplemented by the use of air assault and naval operations on the eastern side of the Straits as the main attack progresses.

We intend to complete the major portion of this attack by WTVD D+30 days. This will be consistent with the likely length of any pause in the WTVD and will allow the use of airlift assets of airborne and air-landing operations.

PHASE IV: CONSOLIDATION

Transition

This phase will begin after the final defeat of Turkish forces in Thrace, which we estimate as occurring between WTVD D+30 and WTVD D+45 days.

Estimate and Objectives

Turkey having been eliminated as a combatant, our forces will be adequate to the task of neutralizing Greece. In addition, by occupying the Aegean littoral and destroying NATO's naval forces in the region, we will have the capability to control the Eastern Mediterranean.

This will be an important period in the war. NATO will have consumed almost all of its prepared logistics support and will be capable of only limited operations. We must exploit success at this point and ultimately be prepared to resume the defensive after Western industrial capabilities begin to replace NATO's war losses.

Based upon this, the objectives for this phase are as follows:

- Complete the destruction of NATO's naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean;
- Consolidate control over western Turkey;
- Envelop the Aegean Sea by occupying the littoral;
- Destroy Greek military capabilities;
- Take control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Naval Operations

Mines must be cleared to allow the Black Sea Fleet to sortie into the Aegean. Naval forces will be used to protect the seaward flank of friendly forces operating in Greece and assume control of the Eastern Mediterranean.

One objective early in the war has been to protect the Black Sea Fleet. If we have been successful, we will have the following forces available for these tasks:

- One attack aircraft carrier
- Two antisubmarine carriers
- Ten cruisers of various types
- Nineteen destroyers of various types
- Fifteen frigates of various types



Fig. 9.2— Axes of advance for Phase IV

- Twenty-five corvettes of various types
- Thirty-two diesel submarines

Air Force Operations

Our tactical air forces will have suffered significant losses by this stage in the campaign. However, we will continue to take advantage of our ability to concentrate them.

The primary air mission during this phase will be to support naval operations and ground operations in Greece.

Ground Force Operations

The ground attack into Greece will require a complicated shifting of lines of communication. Two Soviet combined arms armies will launch the main attack down the Greek peninsula, while two Bulgarian armies make supporting strikes to complete the occupation of Greek Macedonia and Thrace. A third Soviet army will be available for exploitation.

Primary axes of advance are shown in Fig. 9.2. Air and naval landings may be executed in support of these offensives.

PHASE V: BREAKOUT

Transition

This phase will begin once we have gained control of Greece, Turkey, and the Eastern Mediterranean, between WTVD D+45 and WTVD D+75 days.

Estimate and Objectives

This phase probably marks the transition to a prolonged, global, conventional struggle between the socialist camp and imperialism. As such, the objectives and operations for it are less fixed than for the preceding phases. Our principal intent is twofold:

- Introduce large naval forces into the Indian Ocean and eliminate all U.S. and NATO forces operating there; and
- Use the Mediterranean-Suez-Red Sea-Indian Ocean route as a line of communications linking the Black Sea region with the forces of the Far East TVD and the Pacific Fleet.

Appendix

FORCE BALANCE ANNEX

Table A.1

WARSAW PACT GROUND AND AIR FORCES OPPOSING AFSOUTH

Subtheater	Location	Owner	Ground forces	Air forces
Northern Italy	Hungary	USSR	2 motor rifle div'ns 2 tank divisions 1 air assault brigade	135 fighters 45 multi-role 45 FENCER
		Hungary	4 motor rifle div'ns 1 tank division 1 Artillery division	155 fighters 15 CAS
Balkans	Bulgaria	Bulgaria	8 motor rifle div'ns 5 tank brigades 3 artillery regiment	155 fighters 70 multi-role 15 CAS
	Odessa MD	USSR	8 motor rifle div'ns 1 airborne division 1 artillery division 1 air assault bde 1 naval infantry reg't	135 fighters 45 multi-role 100 BACKFIRE
	Kiev MD		8 motor rifle div'ns 8 tank divisions 2 artillery div'isions	45 fighters 45 multi-role
	Romania	Romania	8 motor rifle div'ns 2 tank divisions 3 infantry brigades	230 fighters 120 multi-role
Eastern Turkey	Trans-Caucasus MD	USSR	11 motor rifle div'ns 1 airborne divison	135 fighters 180 multi-role 90 CAS 90 FENCER

Table A.2

WARSAW PACT NAVAL FORCES OPPOSING AFSOUTH

Class	Type	Black Sea Fleet	Mediterranean Squadron	Bulgaria	Romania
Moskva	CVH	2	0	0	0
Slava	CG	1	0	0	0
Kara	CG	3	1	0	0
Kynda	CG	2	0	0	0
Sverdlov	CL	4	0	0	0
Kashin	DDG	4	2	0	2
Kotlin	DDG	3	0	0	0
Kotlin	DD	4	0	0	0
Skoryy	DD	2	2	0	0
Krivak	FFG	4	1	0	0
Various	FF	2	2	0	3
Various	FFL	35	4	3	0
Various	FAC-M	0	0	7	6
Ecno	SSGN	0	1	0	0
Juliette	SSG	3	2	0	0
Various	SSN	0	6	0	0
Various	SS	18	6	4	1

CVH- Helicopter carrier
 CG- Guided-missile cruiser
 CL- Gun or ASW cruiser
 DDG- Guided-missile destroyer
 DD- Gun/ASW destroyer
 FFG- Guided missile frigate
 FF- Gun/ASW frigate
 FFL- Light frigate
 FAC-M- Fast attack craft, missile
 SSGN- Nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine
 SSG- Diesel-powered cruise missile submarine
 SSN- Nuclear-powered attack submarine
 SS- Diesel-powered attack submarine

Table A.3

AFSOUTH GROUND AND AIR FORCES

Subtheater	Location	Owner	Ground forces	Air forces
Northern Italy	Italy	Italy	10 mechanized bdes 4 armored brigades 3 motorized brigades 5 Alpine brigades 2 artillery regiments	84 fighters 54 multi-role 36 CAS 72 <i>Tornado</i>
	U.S.	U.S.	--	96 multi-role 48 CAS
Balkans	Greece	Greece	11 infantry divisions 1 armored division 1 mechanized div'n 5 armored brigades 2 mechanized bdes	80 fighters 132 multi-role 46 CAS
	U.S.		1 U.S. Marine div'n	24 multi-role 24 CAS
	Western Turkey	Turkey	11 Infantry divisions 2 Mechanized div'ns	81 multi-role
Eastern Turkey	Eastern Turkey	Turkey	11 Infantry brigades 6 armored brigades 4 mechanized bdes	36 fighters 86 multi-role 60 CAS
	U.S.	U.S.	--	24 fighters 120 multi-role 48 CAS 24 F-111

NOTE: The U.S. Marine division in the Balkan subtheater deploys along with a Marine Air Wing, which could add an additinal 70 multi-role and CAS aircraft.

Table A.4

AFSOUTH NAVAL FORCES

Type	Sixth Fleet	France	Italy	Greece	Turkey	
Large-deck aircraft carrier	2	2	0	0	0	
Helicopter/VSTOL carrier	0	0	2	0	0	
Battleship		3	0	0	0	0
AEGIS cruiser	3	0	0	0	0	
Guided-missile cruiser	3	1	2	0	0	
<i>Spruance</i> destroyers	6	0	0	0	0	
Guided-missile destroyers	3	1	4	0	0	
Gun/ASW destroyers	0	4	0	14	13	
Guided-missile frigates	6	0	12	2	3	
Gun/ASW frigates	3	3	2	4	2	
Light frigates	0	3	0	0	2	
Missile attack craft	0	0	7	14	14	
Nuclear-powered submarines	4	2	0	0	0	
Diesel-powered submarines	0	8	11	8	17	